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THE ATTRACTION AND SELECTION OF
GOOD DISTRICT COURT JUDGES
LAWRENCE E. WALSH*
One of the jewels of our Anglo-American heritage is our -judicial
system. With all of its defects, delays, costs, and uncertainties, it bridges
more effectively than any other institution the inescapable conflicts be-
tween individual liberty of thought and action and conformance with pat-
terns necessary to democratic government and the avoidance of vio-
lence. The evolution of each of our different courts has produced its par-
ticular brand of individual excellence. The polished skills of an English
barrister, the prompt rendition of decisions of English courts, and the
homespun common sense and differing glints of intellect of our multi-
faceted state courts have all contributed to our incomparable system of
justice.
This paper is devoted to the preservation and strengthening of the
high qualities of the United States federal judiciary. My coiicern with
the quality and selection of district court judges is not new or by any
means unique.' Recent problems with judicial salaries, coupled with the
emergence of the federal courts in the last half century as the' most pro-
lific and perhaps most important part of our judicial system, requires
continuing vigilance to preserve their excellence.
Attracting Lawyers to District Judgeships
My petition is for the preservation of the high quality presently
found in our district court judges. To the individual litigants and the
lawyers who represent them, these are the judges who" will have the
greatest impact on most cases. Their decisions are final in ninety per-
cent of all proceedings. Although appellate courts may correct occasional
errors of law,2 all of the human intangibles focus on the trial judge. In
* A.B. 1932, LL.B. 1935, Columbia University. The Author has served as United
States District Court Judge, S.D.N.Y. (1954-57), Deputy Attorney General (1957-61), Chair-
man of the American Bar Association Standing Committee on Federal Judiciary (1969-72),
and President of the American Bar Association (1975-76). This article is an expanded version
of remarks delivered at the Brookings Institution Seminar on the Administration of Justice,
held at Williamsburg, Virginia on March 6-8, 1981.
' See generally Walsh, Two Basic Steps Toward the Better Selection of Federal
Judges, 12 AM. U. L. REv. 14 (1963); Walsh, The Federal Judiciary... Progress and the
Road Ahead, 43 J. AM. JuD. Socy 155 (1960).
2 The appellate courts' function of correcting errors is not the same as the district
courts' function of correctly deciding cases. Only single issues of a case may be before the
appellate court and presumptions normally operate in favor of the lower court's decision.
Moreover, as the appellate court may only reverse decisions in which there are prejudicial
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reality, the courtesy, efficiency, decency, and decorum of the courtroom
are his responsibility alone.'
The range of problems now committed to these judges would have
seemed unbelievable less than fifty years ago. Still required to give
precedence to the simplest types of criminal proceedings, federal judges
also must manage litigation requiring the review and even the adminis-
tration of large institutions, conduct class actions involving thousands of
claimants, and fashion the ever new forms of relief necessary to meet
equitable needs.' These contributions are not made in the quiet environ-
ment which one ordinarily seeks for reflection. They are hammered out
in tension and in conflict under heavy calendar pressure and in full
public view, sometimes harassed by community pressure and reaction.
Two basic needs must be met to preserve our excellent judicial
system. First, new district court judgeships must be created as the de-
mand upon the system grows.5 Otherwise, the quality of justice is im-
paired by overwork and inadequacy of time for the just determination of
causes.
Second, district court judges must be compensated fairly. Under
standards of selection in effect since the Eisenhower Administration,
most judicial appointees have had to sacrifice more remunerative profes-
sional opportunities.' This is a sacrifice willingly made because of the
honor of public service and the high respect in which the federal
judiciary is held. Unless compensation is kept within limits of fairness,
however, inflation will force the retirement of some of the best judges7
and will discourage many of the most qualified candidates from accept-
ing appointments.8
errors or which are clearly erroneous, the decisions it upholds may not be actually "correct"
in the trial court sense. See Cohn & Baxter, The Trial Court in the Hierarchy of Judicial
Lawmaking: A Threshold Schema, 59 GEO. L.J. 1, 19-20 n.74 (1970).
' See generally Chandler, The Role of the Trial Judge in the Anglo-American Legal
System, 50 A.B.A. J. 125 (1964); Jones, The Trial Judge-Role Analysis and Profile, in THE
COURTS, THE PUBLIC AND THE LAW EXPLOSION 124 (H. Jones ed. 1965).
' See generally Federal Judicial Center, Proceedings of Seminar for Newly Ap-
pointed'United States District Judges, 75 F.R.D. 89 (1976) (indicating broad scope of district
court issues). The proportion of pending complex cases (antitrust, civil rights, class actions,
etc.) has been steadily increasing. See Freeman, Crisis in the Federal Courts: A District
Judge's Analysis, 13 GA. ST. B.J. 130, 130 (1977); Schwarzer, Managing Civil Litigation: The
Trial Judge's Role, 61 JUDICATURE 401, 401 n.1 (1978).
See generally Mikva, More Judgeships-But Not All At Once, 39 WASH. & LEE L.
REV. 23 (1982).
' See Quadrennial Commission Recommends Increases for Federal Judges, 67 A.B.A.
J. 162, 162-64 (1981); Chapin, The Judicial Vanishing Act, 58 JUDICATURE 160, 160-61 (1974)
[hereinafter cited as Chapin]; Kraft, The Case for Increased Judicial Compensation, 55 FLA.
B.J. 366, 368 (1981).
' See Chapin, supra note 6, at 161; McGee, Are Judicial Salary Increases Coming?, 60
A.B.A. J. 1259, 1260 (1974); Note, Compensation of the Federal Judiciary: A Reexamination,
8 U. MICH. J. L. REF. 594, 603 (1975).
' See Mooney, Federal Judges Compensation-Proposed Legislation, 27 N.Y.U. L.
REV. 457, 457 (1952).
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Ideally, a judicial appointee should be between the ages of forty and.
fifty five. In other words, he should be experienced but young enough to
undertake the heavy workload he must carry and flexible enough to
adapt to the demands of his new calling. Between these years, however,
the demands of an appointee's family are likely to be the highest, since
his -children are probably in preparatory school, college, or graduate
school. It is also at this age that he is at the height of his earning capa-
city. Unless judicial compensation is sufficient to attract the most pro-
mising lawyers within this age group, the available pool ultimately will
be limited to the independently wealthy, the less qualified, and older at-
torneys who have passed their most productive years.
The Selection Process
In the United States the process of selecting judges is more complex
and less orderly than that in England.' In England the legal profession is
divided between barristers and solicitors. Judges are selected from the
bar which in turn is divided into four inns of court, each consisting'of less
than one thousand members. Lord Widgery, the late Lord Chief Justice,
once told me that he had at least a nodding acquaintance with every bar-
rister and knew most of them, not only in his own Inn, but in the other
three as well. A judicial vacancy is filled by the Queen oh the recommen-
dation of the Lord Chancellor, who in turn, on an informal basis, may
seek the advice of other judges and the benchers of the inns of court-
members of a small governing body of each inn. In this way appoint-
ments to the bench are expected to be on the basis of merit with little
weight to political factors frequently considered in the United States."
In the United States there are over three hundred thousand lawyers
and there is no division of the profession between trial lawyers and
others. Nor are there any institutions comparable to the inns of court. In
the United States, the President appoints federal judges, with the ad-
vice and consent of the Senate." These federal judgeships are among the
most important of a President's appointments. With life tenure, the
long-term influence of a federal judge will probably exceed that of office
holders serving merely during the term of an individual President.
A President searching for a judicial nominee depends upon the At-
torney General who in turn leaves the responsibility to the Deputy At-
torney General." The Deputy Attorney General is unlikely to have first-
See generally Coldstream, Judicial Appointments in England, 43 J. AM. JUD. SOCY
41 (1959); Goddard, Politics and the British Bench, 43 J. AM. JUD. SocY 124 (1959).
"0 Stason, Judicial Selection Around The World, 41 J. AM. JuD. Socv 134, 136 (1958).
" U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2.
,2 President Eisenhower in particular recognized the importance of federal judgeships.
Until his first heart attack, he met personally every federal judicial nominee before he sent
the nomination to the Senate. See Rogers, Judicial Appointments in the Eisenhower Ad-
ministration, 41 A.B.A. J. 38 (1957).
S See Chase, Federal Judges: The Appointing Process, 51 MINN. L. REV. 185, 195
(1966) [hereinafter cited as Chase].
19821
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hand information as to lawyers outside of his own state and a few other
places to which his practice may have taken him. He therefore turns to
the senators of the state in which the vacancy occurs if they are
members of the same party as the President. If they are not, he ordinar-
ily consults the chairman of the national committee of the President's
political party.
From these sources the Deputy Attorney General compiles a list of
possible candidates. He then has the responsibility for evaluating those
suggestions. For this purpose he can seek help from two principal sources:
the Standing Committee on the Federal Judiciary of the American Bar
Association (ABA Committee) and the Federal Bureau of Investigation
(FBI).
Usually, the Deputy Attorney General will first consult the ABA
Committee. The Committee is composed of fourteen lawyers divided
among the twelve judicial districts. It has no staff and has never sought
one. The Committee works informally and can give the Deputy Attorney
General a quick preliminary response after interviewing twenty or
thirty lawyers in the appropriate community. The advantage of the pre-
liminary investigation is that it reduces the awkwardness of rejection
after the public interest generated by a more broad-scale investigation.
If the informal investigation indicates that the prospective nominee is
"probably Not Qualified," the ABA Committee interviews the candidate
and provides him the opportunity to comment on problems which may
have arisen before such a negative report is made to the Deputy Attor-
ney General.14 If the ABA Committee concludes at the informal stage
that the proposed nominee is "probably Not Qualified," the Deputy At-
torney General usually will not request a formal report.15
If the potential nominee is highly regarded, the Deputy Attorney
General is then in a position to request a more extensive investigation
by both the ABA Committee and the FBI. The ABA Committee will
undertake a thorough investigation among the lawyers of the district in
which the vacancy occurs. The FBI will obtain for the Deputy Attorney
General a community survey as to the person concerned. FBI agents can
interview a wide variety of people who may be able to provide informa-
tion about a candidate's character which would not come to light in the
ABA Committee's investigation."6 The FBI acts solely as an impartial
fact-gathering agency and does not evaluate its own reports. 7
The ABA Committee has been performing its investigatory respon-
sibility for at least fifty years. 8 Its present role, however, began at the
1 See Report of the Standing Committee on Federal Judiciary, 101 A.B.A. REP. 759,
760 (1976).
15 Id.
" See Chase, supra note 13, at 200-01.
17 Id. at 201.
18 See generally Grossman, Federal Judicial Selections; The Work of One ABA Com-
mittee, 8 MIDWEST J. POL. Sci. 221 (1964); Grossman, Role of the American Bar Association
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close of the Truman Administration and with the beginning of the
Eisenhower Administration. At that time, the President made the criti-
cal decision to permit the Committee to review potential nominees
before they were nominated, rather than express its views in opposition
or support before the Senate Judiciary Committee following the nomina-
tion. As a result, the ABA Committee was far better able to get frank
and candid responses to its inquiry. Once the nomination is made and an-
nounced, adverse comment tends to subside and the ABA Committee
may be misled by those who are reluctant to criticize someone who is ex-
pected to hold such high and powerful office.
The ABA Committee never makes its own recommendation. It mere-
ly responds to the names of persons that the Deputy Attorney General
submits to it. The Committee believes that if it recommended candidates
for vacancies it might compromise its principal responsibility of advising
the Deputy Attorney General as to the qualifications of prospective
nominees submitted by him. 9
The ABA Committee does not attempt to evaluate the personal
philosophy of the potential nominee. The Committee bases its response
solely upon professional qualifications and these have, over the years,
been specified as integrity, judicial temperament, and legal ability." The
Committee not only distinguishes between qualified and nonqualified
nominees, it attempts to grade them into categories of exceptionally well
qualified, well qualified, qualified, and not qualified.' By so categorizing
the nominees, the Committee recognizes that it is desirable to seek only
the best qualified, rather than merely exclude the nonqualified.22
In the process of evaluating the nominees, the ABA Committee con-
siders several very flexible factors. One factor is trial experience: the
Committee usually finds that some trial experience is necessary for a
candidate to be found qualified.' Another basic requirement is good
health and an age which reflects experience at the bar adequate to per-
form demanding judicial work. The potential nominee's age should leave,
hopefully, at least ten years for judicial service. During the Eisenhower
Administration, it became established that no lawyer sixty years or over
should be appointed to a lifetime judgeship for the first time, unless he
in the Selection of Federal Judges: Episodic Involvement of Institutionalized Power, 17
VAND. L. REv. 785 (1964); Committee on Federal Judiciary: What It Is and How It Works,
63 A.B.A. J. 803 (1977) [hereinafter cited as Committee on Federal Judiciary].
" See Report of the Standing Committee on Federal Judiciary, 101 A.B.A. REP. 759,
759 (1976).
See-Committee on Federal Judiciary, supra note 18, at 806.
21 See id.; A.B.A., HANDBOOK FOR MEMBERS OF JUDICIARY COMMITTEES 4-5 (describing
standards for the four categories).
I Report of the Standing Committee on Federal Judiciary, 83 A.B.A. REP. 349, 350
(1958).
' See Committee on Federal Judicial, supra note 18, at 807 (indicating importance of
substantial trial experience); Chandler, supra note 3, at 126 (arguing that judicial candidate
must have at least 15 years experience in trial-oriented practice).
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was found to be "well qualified" or "exceptionally well qualified" and in
excellent health. 4 The ABA Committee for many years would not recom-
mend as qualified a person over the age of sixty four. The Committee
reconsidered these guidelines in 1970, but made no substantial changes.'
After evaluating the qualifications of the nominee and rendering its
report to the Attorney General, the Committee does not publicly an-
nounce its specific rating. After the nomination is made, the Committee
submits its evaluation of the nominee's qualifications to the Senate
Judiciary Committee. 6 Though not required to do so, the Judiciary Com-
mittee of the United States Senate has requested the opinion of the ABA
Committee on every judicial nomination since 1948.1 Regardless, the By-
Laws of the ABA authorize the Committee to oppose the nomination and
confirmation of persons whom it considers not qualified for federal
judicial positions.28
During the thirty years that the ABA Committee has exercised its
present role, it has been highly successful in its work. Seldom does a
President nominate, and the Senate Judiciary Committee confirm, a per-
son whom the ABA Committee finds not qualified. 9 Perhaps more impor-
tantly, Presidents and attorney generals have come to share the view
that the President and his administration benefit by a reputation for
good judicial appointments.
The Committee has extensively reviewed its procedures twice since
the Eisenhower period. In 1970, the Committee was heavily criticized for
its failure to oppose the nomination of Judge Carswell to the Supreme
Court. As a result, it undertook extensive self-evaluation and sought the
advice of bar leaders, law teachers, judges, and other persons active in
public affairs."0 The Committee extensively revised its procedures for
the review of Supreme Court nominations which posed problems quite
different from that of district court nominations,2 and which are not the
subject of this article.2 For the most part, the Committee left intact its
procedures for evaluating nominees for district court and appellate
court judgeships.
2 See Segal, Federal Judicial Selection-Progress and the Promise of the Future, 46
MAss. L.Q. 138, 142 (1961).
, See Report of the Standing Committee on Federal Judiciary, 95 A.B.A. REP. 206,
206-07 (1970).




See Report of the Standing Committee on Federal Judiciary, 100 A.B.A. REP. 782,
783 (1975); Committee on Federal Judiciary, supra note 18, at 807.
' See Report of the Standing Committee on Federal Judiciary, 95 A.B.A. REP. 711,
711-12 (1970).
" See Report of the Standing Committee on Federal Judiciary, 97 A.B.A. REP. 217,
218 (1972).
, See Committee on Federal Judiciary, supra note 18, at 804-06 (1977).
[Vol. XXXIX
DISTRICT COURT JUDGES
In 1976, the President of the ABA convened a two day meeting at
Vanderbilt University to which judges, law school teachers, public of-
ficers, and others were invited to again review the procedures of the
ABA Committee.3 After consideration of all criticisms and suggestions,
the Committee made modest changes in its procedures. Currently, the
Committee is again reviewing its procedures and classifications. The
basic elements, however, remain as they have for the last thirty years.
The Committee remains in an extremely delicate position. It is not
an agency of government and has no constitutional or statutory basis.
The Committee's position and influence are dependent upon others: the
government officials with whom it works, and the lawyers and judges
who must give candid and thoughtful appraisals of the candidates. The
Committee must seek to maintain the confidence of these persons in the
complete objectivity, the scrupulous fairness, and the painstaking
thoroughness of the Committee's investigations and reports.
The viability of the selection mechanism, its formal and informal
parts, is also vulnerable to the persistent neglect'of fair judicial salaries.
The ABA Committee's goal is to evaluate candidates and identify the
most qualified individuals for the federal judiciary. The current inade-
quacy of judicial salaries will ultimately impede this process in two cer-
tain ways. First, economic self-selection out of the process by some can-
didates reduces the quality of the candidate pool. Second, the inadequacy
of judicial salaries causes judicial vacancies as judges leave the bench for
more remunerative opportunities.u
Conclusion
It is my impression that most trial lawyers believe that the federal
court has attracted and retained an exceptionally able group of judges.
These attorneys are relatively satisfied with the system of selection and
the informal and formal elements of the judicial nominating procedure.
It is apparent, however, that the continued ability to select qualified
federal judges requires more than adjusting the machinery of the ABA
Committee or the formalization of channels of communication between
the Bar and the Attorney General. There is widespread concern that the
short-sighted denial of adjustments in compensation, necessary to pre-
serve a professional standard of living in the face of inflation, will under-
mine the success of the last thirty years in attracting able, qualified, and
in many cases, exceptional lawyers to the bench. Fairness and the self in-
terest of a well served community demands a decent adjustment.
,3 See A.B.A., ANNUAL REPORT OF THE PRESIDENT 6-7 (1975-76).
-' See Report of the Standing Committee on Federal Judiciary, 101 A.B.A. REP. 759,
759 (1976).
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